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This book is a starting point for an important discussion that very few people are willing to 
engage in, not only because it has the potential to stir controversy, but also because it lends 
itself to generalizations that open the door for criticism. It is praiseworthy that the economist 
Timur Kuran decided to embark on this risky task, despite his own recognition that historians 
might find the generalizations in this book unsettling. Going beyond essentialist approaches 
that explain the decline of the Middle East vis-à-vis Europe in terms of flaws inherent within 
Islam itself, or of supposed Muslim characteristics such as fatalism, Kuran’s explanation is 
grounded in institutions. The negative effects of these institutions do not necessarily reflect 
poorly on the Islamic faith, as some of them developed after the formative period, while 
others are commendable for their egalitarianism. Kuran also challenges the Islamist discourse 
that the failure of Muslims was brought about when the Ottomans abandoned Islam, 
countering that Ottoman secularization happened long after the region’s standing in the world 
had deteriorated. To him, the institutional matrix that blocked evolutionary paths towards 
more complex institutions consists of the Islamic law of commercial partnerships, the Islamic 
inheritance system, the religious endowment system, and the individualism of Islamic law. 
Kuran shows that in the first millennium, the Middle East did not have an institutional 
disadvantage vis-à-vis Europe. The Islamic law of partnership, which was based on business 
ventures predating Islam, offered enough flexibility to investors and merchants, and 
represented a significant step on the road from kinship-based exchange to impersonal 
exchange. However, it failed to produce the transformations necessary to keep the Middle 
East globally competitive in the second millennium, which is when the long divergence 
started. Supporting his argument with figures from 17th-century Ottoman cities, Kuran 
contends that part of the problem is the short life of Middle Eastern partnerships, which were 
typically intended for short-term business ventures. They could not outlive their founders, 
since Islamic law did not recognize corporate legal personhood. On the death of one of the 
partners, the business was dissolved and assets were divided among heirs. While the Islamic 
inheritance system was more egalitarian than that of many European countries, it was not 
conducive to the longevity of partnerships. The death of a businessman in Britain or the Low 
Countries would most likely lead to the eldest son taking over the business through 
primogeniture. But in Islamic law, other sons would receive equal shares and women would 
also inherit, contributing to the fragmentation of partnerships. The practice of polygyny 
complicated the situation by adding more heirs, thus increasing the fragmentation. 
Kuran wonders, “Might some other problem be the fundamental cause of 
underdevelopment, and organizational stagnation merely its byproduct?” (p. 14). He 
considers multiple factors such as the state’s role as an enforcer of property rights and the 
production of knowledge, which he contends must have all affected one another. To consider 
one factor the root cause of all problems would be to commit the “fallacy of absolute 
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priority,” he recognizes (p. 15). It is the problem of the chicken and the egg, in which each 
entity serves as both source and product. Thus, he argues for a bidirectional causal 
relationship between multiple variables, while admitting what he describes as legitimate 
concerns about endogeneity; hence the starting point is inevitably arbitrary. 
The attractiveness of accepting institutional rigidity as a byproduct of economic 
stagnation rather than a cause of it is that under this scenario, there would be no need to 
explain why there was no noticeable divergence of fortunes between the Middle East and 
Europe as early as the institutional divergence started in the 10th century. There would also be 
no need to explain why Islamic law, with its internal flexibility mechanisms, did not 
accommodate institutional transformation. Kuran rightly recognizes the ability of Islamic law 
to overcome its own rigidities. He holds, for instance, that if some major constituency had 
pressured the state to recognize legal personhood in commercial organizations, religious 
obstacles could have been overcome. Why then did the Middle East’s legal-commercial 
structure remain unreformed until the 19th century? 
Kuran offers religious, social, and political explanations for the lack of a concept of 
corporation, despite its presence in both the Persian and Roman empires. According to him, 
the notion of self-governance of sub-communities was not adopted in the Middle East due to 
the presumed comprehensiveness of Islamic law, regulating all aspects of life without ceding 
ground to secular legislation. In addition to the nature of Islamic law, jurists would have 
opposed relinquishing their power to self-governing organizations because they derived rents 
from legal interpretation. By contrast, Canon law coexisted with Roman law, each with its 
own jurisdiction. 
Kuran acknowledges the flexibility of Islamic law and the ability of practice to surge 
ahead of doctrine, with judges accommodating alien organizational forms. The lack of 
organizational accommodation, he rightly concedes, means that the reason lies in a lack of 
demand. I believe this is the key challenge to his argument. One can argue that madhhab 
pluralism already provides solutions for some of the problems with Islamic law that Kuran 
discusses. For instance, Hanbali contract law could have been used in placing conditions in 
waqf deeds enabling the endower to accumulate capital and giving the supervisor free rein in 
managing the waqf property, thus functioning more like a corporation. This utilitarian 
selection of different school doctrines to avoid legal rigidities such as the inalienability of 
waqf assets or the fragmentation of property was widespread in the Ottoman period.1 
Similarly, if there were demand for longer partnerships, Muslim merchants could have used 
the Maliki school to avoid the dissolution of the Islamic partnership, known as muḍāraba, 
upon the death of a partner.2 Even changes that were not possible through madhhab pluralism 
could have been introduced in practice followed by a theoretical adjustment.3 
While Kuran and I are in agreement on the flexibility of Islamic law and hence on the 
lack of demand for institutional transformation, I view the lack of demand as posing a 
challenge to the causal relationship that Kuran posits. He sees it as a reflection of missing 
institutional preconditions. Granted, the interconnectedness of the institutional matrix must 
have posed greater resistance to change. Nevertheless, conceding that Islamic law was 
capable of accommodating organizational transformation, and that there was no demand for 
it, undermines Kuran’s argument for causality, as the preconditions themselves are not 
exempt from the transformative mechanisms of Islamic law. 
                                                      
1 Ahmed Fekry Ibrahim, “School Boundaries and Social Utility in Islamic Law: The Theory and Practice of 
Talfīq and Tattabuʿ al-Rukhaṣ in Egypt”, PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 2011, pp. 120-164. 
2 Muḍāraba is a type of partnership in which an investor entrusts capital to an agent, who trades with it for a 
proportion of the profits. 
3 See for instance, Ibrahim, “School Boundaries and Social Utility in Islamic Law”, pp. 90-93. 
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The discussion of the causes of decline leads to the issue of recovery: Why were 
Middle Eastern Christians and Jews at the forefront of economic development in the 18th and 
19th centuries, before Muslims became involved? On this issue, Kuran explores the legal and 
business structures adopted by minorities in the Middle East. He argues that Islamic legal 
pluralism, which enabled them to use the laws of their own religious traditions rather than 
those of Islam, was not exercised prior to the 18th century. Rather, there was a convergence 
between the legal and business structures of Muslims and minorities caused partly by the lure 
of the Islamic courts’ superior power of enforcement. This, he adds, explains why minorities 
did as badly as Muslim merchants prior to the 18th century, and suggests that their fast-
improving fortunes can be attributed to their ability in the 18th and 19th centuries to draw 
upon European commercial and legal institutions. He skillfully delineates their ascent 
through discussions of the capitulations, Islamic legal pluralism, and the incorporation of 
minorities into European commercial networks. 
Kuran’s groundbreaking study is a must read, as it opens new and important doors of 
inquiry. It deserves to become a standard in courses on Middle East economic history, as it 
sheds light on the inner workings of Islamic legal institutions, their impact on the economic 
performance of the Middle East, and their mutually reinforcing interactions. The ensuing 
discussion should continue examining institutions without presupposing the inherent 
superiority of Western culture. It is my hope that historians will closely examine some of the 
hypotheses in this book through micro-histories in order to expand our understanding of the 
institutional interactions that influenced the economic trajectory of the region. 
